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Introduction 
ANNA ELISABETTA GALEOTTI*
This collection of essays represents the first outcome of the Collaborative research
project funded by the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme
(SSH-2009-3.3.1) on the theme: “RESPECT Towards a ‘Topography’ of Tolerance
and Equal Respect. A comparative study of policies for the distribution of public
spaces in culturally diverse societies”. More precisely, the following essays are the
result of the first stage of the research work carried out by the team of the Università
del Piemonte Orientale under my supervision and some contributions from other
scholars who have worked extensively on these issues.
Within the RESPECT research project, our team has picked up a leading
hypothesis orienting the work both at the theoretical and at the applied level, namely
that equal respect should be seen as the fundamental value that underlies the two
most common conceptions of toleration in contemporary political theory. Both the
neutralist ideal of toleration, implying the advocacy of universal social, civil and
political rights, and the approach of toleration as recognition, calling for identity-
specific claims, refer to the fundamental value of respect for persons. Equal respect
can thus constitute the normative ground for a revisited conception of toleration that
is able to reconcile claims both of universalist and particularist nature. The equal
respect due to each member of the polity requires that, when confronting with
individuals and people who are not yet enjoying the full status of citizens, it should
be articulated as the public recognition of his or her identity. In turn, identities which
have been factors of exclusion should be conceived instrumentally, as subsumed
under the universal umbrella of civil, political and social rights that are constitutive
of the status of equal citizenship. In this way, toleration, based on respect, and
implying the instrumental recognition of previously excluded identity, becomes part
of the general scheme for fulfilling the promises of democratic citizenship where all
people are considered and treated with equal respect.
This general hypothesis, which is explored in detailed in the essay by Roberta Sala
“Toleration and Respect in a Multicultural Society. An Overview”, requires to be
specified in order to be usefully employed and tested in the analysis of applied ethics
which constitute the perspective of most papers of this collection. The essay by Roberta
Sala is precisely aimed at a preliminary conceptual clarification of the two key-concepts
of our work, at a critical analysis of the current debate, and of the more significant
options of contemporary political theory. Sala defends a conception of toleration as
recognition as an instrument of justice and more precisely as an instrument to grant full
inclusions to minority members and bearers of social differences. 
* Professor, Philosophy, Università del Piemonte Orientale.
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 244549.
Equal Respect and 
Distribution of Public Spaces
Edited by 
Enrico Biale and Chiara Testino
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Diverse Distributions of Public Space – 
A Public Good for Whom?
FEDERICA LIVERIERO*
Introduction
In the contemporary multicultural context, liberal democracies face continuous
negotiations among citizens and diverse groups. Some of these negotiations are rather
intractable, involving claims from individuals belonging to minority groups. Often,
such requests are not adequately managed by liberal institutions. In fact, they lack a
theoretical flexibility that would allow them to identify the salient features of different
claims and to reconnect these contextual differences to a more general theory. In order
to improve the connection between the theory and the reality, it is important to develop
analyses of actual concrete negotiations, focusing on specific kinds of claims that are
raised. In this paper, I address the distribution of public spaces. In light of this subject
(and at a very general level) my aim is to offer better definitions of the ways in which
these claims should be laid (i.e. by who and how) and to develop a comparison with
the economic theory of public goods.
In order to properly analyse the claim-negotiation relationship, the concept of
public space stands to be extremely useful. In addition to being a scarce, and thus a
contested good, public space is a place in which society produces and legitimates its
own image and self-perception. Therefore, issues concerning public spaces always
involve issues of recognition, as any redistribution of this particular good inescapably
yields a new image of the polis and, from the perspective of the individual or group, a
new paradigm of visibility1. Hence, the intrinsically public nature of this kind of good
allows me to emphasize the issue of recognition within public spaces, recognizing that
“how” such spaces are distributed is at least as important as “what” spaces are
distributed. In what follows, I will offer more details that describe how every claim
also implies a public recognition of identity that can itself be divided in two parts:
- The actual claim for distribution of a particular good.
- The public recognition of diversity.
The basic difference between these two aspects is that the latter is never negotiable,
even when it is impossible to reach a compromise when negotiating actual policies.
That is, amidst various identity claims, what essentially is not negotiable is not the
distribution of a particular good, but rather the act of recognition that this
distribution as a rule implies2.
* PhD Candidate, Politics, LUISS, Roma. 
The views expressed during the execution of the RESPECT project in whatever form or by
whatever medium are the sole responsibility of the authors. The European Union is not liable for any
use that may be made of the information contained therein. 
Regeneration, Multiculturalism and Respect for Persons. The Case of San Salvario).
San Salvario, which is located near the city center and closed to the main railway
station in Torino, became explosive in the nineties, the negative example of diverse
co-habitation, where the immigrant presence was resented by the original population
as a risk to security and as degradation of property value. It was then the protest of
the original population which suggested local institutions to intervene and try an
experiment of multiculturalism in the area. The result, as Biale shows, are mixed
especially in terms of participation and of effective involvement of the immigrant
population, though, for example, schools are considered a success. 
Finally the collection ends with the paper by Chiara Testino on the issue of Roma
campsites (“‘Nomadism’ and Housing Policies. Roma in Italy: a Hard Case for the
Theory of Minority Rights”). In this case, there is no clear direction of analysis,
whether top-down or bottom-up, given that the preliminary point to clarify is whether
Roma are a national, cultural or ethnic minority. Testino shows that Roma and Sinti
groups escape all the usual categorizations for groups, according to established
tipology such as Kymlicka. Consequently, if their nomad lifestyle raises problem of
public order, it is unclear how Roma, who have no definable collective identity, can
be recipients of public policy and, being dispersed and disorganized, with different
interests and aims, can play the role of collective agents asserting their rights. The
controversy over the illegal occupation of public areas for camping symbolized their
marginal location, at the outskirts of cities and of democratic society. Testino suggests
that in their case, their identity cannot constitute the grounds from which advancing
right claim, because there is no available identity for the whole people; yet the pursuit
of a common identity should become a tranformative goal and a future vantage point
for fighting discrimination. 
All the papers in this collection are example of applied ethics. The case-study are
considered as paradigmatic examples of controversies over toleration and integration
concerning urban space, in the various dimensions above specified. The empirical
reconstruction of the cases make use of existing data and researches that are already
available, while the point is to enlighten the normative dimension of the case and,
finally, to devise principles and guidelines for policy. In the end, there is no single
set of conclusions to draw from the different cases, since each presents special
features and calls for specific answer. Yet we can draw some considerations on our
applied ethics method which provides a distinctive perspective on issues and
enriches the public discussion with rigorous normative analysis.
6 Introduction
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such, it is not justifiable from the universal paradigm of democratic citizenship. As a
result, this request for adhesion to some form of homogeneity (however veiled) is an
intrinsic difficulty of every kind of collective association.
In the introduction I argued that in the case of liberal societies, every claim for
the re-allocation of goods is connected to arguments about justice and membership. I
would like to focus my attention next on the fact that redistributions that concern
space as public good are emblematic of this strict connection between redistribution
issue and struggle for membership. Moreover, the distribution of public space
involves both theoretical and pragmatic difficulties. At the level of theory, the liberal
tradition regards the “public” space as neutral and impartial, therefore, the same
theory has some reserve in legitimatizing unequal treatments as the mean for treating
persons as really equals8. Yet, at the level of application, the majority accepts these
claims with difficulty, since a secondary effect of sharing via the fair redistribution
of public spaces with those who are not full members, also involves an enlargement
of the paradigm of “normality”. 
Conflicts over the distribution of public space, more than other allocation-related
issues, show how minority identities claim a more flexible and egalitarian way for
defining public standards and that they need to struggle for such standards. In fact,
such claims attempt to contrast the majority’s tendency to accept the status quo and
its prejudicial arrangements as an established context that is neutral and just9.
However these clashes are never zero-sum relationships, as minorities are not
seeking unfair privileges or exemptions within a public space where all possess the
same level of visibility. On the contrary, minority identity groups are demanding
compensation for injustices rooted in the same paradigm of liberal neutrality.
Consequently, not only do the majority of citizens have difficulty accepting such
requests (a majority who already feel included under the umbrella of normality and
interpret these claims as an inadequate invasion of public space by aggressive
minorities), but also liberal theory itself does not possess, at least traditionally, the
right tools for managing these demands for justice10. In this regard, I argue that such
claims need to be negotiated publicly, that this should occur among the three
relevant agents and that such a dialogue should also be “multilogical”11.
2. Three different distributions
In the previous section I argued that the issue of public spaces is extremely
important for contemporary debates about identity claims advanced by minorities
within liberal democracies. Next, I will show how many of the problems created by
these claims are born of a general confusion about the real nature of these requests.
In order to develop a better understanding of the issues at stake, I suggest that such
claims can be divided into three subcategories:
a. the distribution of public spaces for private usage by communities.
b. the equal right to the distribution of the public’s own spaces for private usage by
minority individuals, advanced in terms of equal treatment qua individuals.
9Federica Liveriero
Analysing the issue of public space demands facing one of the most difficult
tensions within multicultural democracies, as the public nature of such spaces
inevitably involves the allocation of a good and a definition of the “we” that
constitutes the polis. Indeed, the social meaning of the “we”, requires continuous
reappraisals and adjustments that must be conducted in accordance with a just and
dialogical process and according to a principle of equal respect, where all citizens
are able to speak in their own voice3. Conceptually, this emphasis on membership
in the polis as a pre-requisite to accessing any allocation, allows me to connect the
struggle for the distribution of public spaces to the institutional management of
public goods. Highlighting the similarity between the two (and though they emerge
out of the different contexts of political theory and economics) stands to be useful
for connecting the public debate on public space to a discussion about the lack of
motivation for collective actions. According to my interpretation, in order to
overcome this motivational impasse, we must establish criteria for determining
legitimate claims by citizens; we must also study the ways in which institutions
should manage particular issues through productive dialogue with citizens. Of
course, in public political debate, the dialogic relationship between institutions and
citizens does not always involve the same dynamic, much less the same number, of
agents. In dealing with requests for the distribution of public space, I argue that the
dialogical framework is nonetheless structured according to a triadic form, with
three principal agents: political institutions, a majority and disadvantaged
minorities.
1. Claiming the public space
Within every comparison between institutions and citizens, a fundamental issue is to
determine “who” has the right to lay certain claims. This analysis argues that re-
distributive claims are never entirely disconnected from issues surrounding
membership rights4. Determining who is entitled to belong to the polis is a complex
issue because from a strictly moral point of view it is impossible to justify the
existence of boundaries5. However, such boundaries do play a central role in the
definition of a “political community”, as they are necessary for the maintenance of
its institutions. Moreover, we are all accustomed to the idea that such boundaries are
“normal” and justified; at least, we tend to accept the argument for their existence on
the basis of their political effectiveness. Hence, leaving aside the discussion about
the moral dimensions surrounding the legitimacy of a state’s boundaries, I suggest
that in liberal democracies, contemporary public discussions about public space are
inextricably linked to conflicts over re-determining membership criteria6. In fact, the
membership issue shows that the associative character of the polis is always
culturally mediated because it is impossible to start from a totally neutral paradigm
of “citizenship”. Hence, associative bonds involve (sometimes implicitly) an
adherence to social standards that are patterned after majority characters7. Moreover,
the request to adhere to such standards is implicit and extremely equivocal, and as
8 Diverse Distributions of Public Space – A Public Good for Whom?
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mistakenly taken to be neutral. The distribution of public space as a symbolic
place, affirming the right of minority identities to be visible, is extremely
complicated, as the allocative question (in this case) tends to coincide with the
recognition of identity. Essentially, what is “distributed” is the equal recognition
of all identities present within public and institutional contexts. In this regard,
what is at stake here is the standard of normality to be accepted in a society.
3. Review of liberal paradigm
The analysis of the various claims for distribution of public spaces above suggests
that liberal institutions, in dealing with such claims, should promote a important
effort for revising some aspects of liberal theory, or, even more difficult, for
developing new solutions that stand to contradict (in part) with the traditional liberal
answers for such distribution-like problems. Indeed, all such claims, if accepted and
justified for the correct reasons, would lead liberal democracies to construct a more
inclusive concept of citizenship. However, we are very far from reaching this goal,
as claims for recognition by disadvantaged identities are strongly opposed currently
by some majority citizens and by the dominant institutions. The latter, in fact, are
not inclined to review or reformulate liberal theory, as such revision is extremely
complex and could only be developed in a dialogical manner, involving inescapably
contentious negotiations with citizens. Nevertheless, if a framework for negotiations
is built correctly, then liberal theory stands to become more suitable for the
contemporary multicultural context15.
One of my intentions is to show that liberal institutions, should they remain
entrenched in their historical positions, stand to lose a large slice of their legitimacy,
as traditional liberal solutions can no longer respond adequately to certain claims
laid by citizens of multicultural democracies. Thus, it is crucial that political and
social action with respect to negotiations about public spaces be twofold, involving
the following two types of movements:
- bottom up, in the case of claims made by individuals and communities to
institutions (e.g., students’ parents for the school in Via Quaranta) and
- top down, in the case of claims that originate in the autonomous will of
institutions to address a problem of democratic society (e.g., Piedmont regional
law in favour of Roma population16).
That said, accepting the premise that liberal institutions should promote a review
of their answers to the claims of certain citizens, it is important to stress that these
changes could be conducted while still maintaining an adherence to the classical
liberal paradigm. For instance, I have already pointed out that in the case of
distributing public spaces of the first type (for private community), one can employ
two different justifications. The first argument starting from the normative principle
of equal respect and refers only to individual rights, even though justified in view of
compensation for those citizens who belong to a disadvantaged group. The second
option, by contrast, stands to dramatically change the liberal paradigm, legitimizing
11Federica Liveriero
c. the equal access to public space for minority members advanced in response to
the majority’s monopoly on the symbolic meanings of the public space.
a. The first case involves claims for the equal treatment of cultures. Herein lies a
community’s claim for the opportunity to promote its own culture within a
society’s public spaces. The case of the Egyptian school in Via Quaranta belongs
within this category12. Indeed, the extension of the right to have confessional
schools requires that institutions promote a public recognition of certain
minorities in the territory. What causes the greatest problem with such claims is
the fact that they are laid by citizens with respect to their belonging to certain
groups. Consequently, both the manner in which the claim is submitted, as well
as the answer provided by the relevant institutions, can entail significant
confusion. The fundamental criterion for legitimate claims lies in the fact that
certain individuals suffered discrimination because they belonged to a particular
minority group; therefore, compensation via justice can only be affirmed by
underscoring that the demand is acceptable based on the fact that these
individuals belonged to a disadvantaged group. Moreover, difficulties can arise
from the fact that some minority claims involve little more than a request to be
treated as equals before the law (i.e., the right of having confessional schools is
rule of law), while other claims demand An affirmative action by institutions and
also involve unequal treatments in order to overcome earlier inequalities (e.g.
distribution of specific territory to indigenous peoples).
b. The second kind of claim involves, for example, the distribution of housing to
immigrants or Roma13. In this case, what seems to be at stake is closer to the
classical conception of an allocated good. However, these distributions, although
enjoyed by individuals, are again justified with respect to a condition held by
certain disadvantaged minority groups. Thus, these distributions are often
strongly opposed, as they seem to be incompatible with two historic axes of
liberal democracies: universalism and equality before the law. In fact, some
citizens would receive different or preferential treatment, obtaining a favourable
distribution. Again, what matters most here is the way in which such partial
distributions are publicly justified. The classical approach to these issues
manages such claims by means of blind neutrality, focused strictly on economic
disadvantage (i.e., the allocative-wellbeing paradigm of the classic neutral
liberalism), whereas an alternative answer evaluates not just the economic
conditions but also the lack of integration and historical injustice suffered by
individuals for belonging to a particular minority identity14.
c. The third category involves cases of strictly symbolic recognition. Among those,
we can count the struggle to wear the headscarf in public schools or the
opposition to the presence of a crucifix in institutional places. In both cases,
public space is understood as a symbolic context, within which the liberal ideal
of neutrality has a duty to oppose the implementation of unilateral standards,
10 Diverse Distributions of Public Space – A Public Good for Whom?
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involvement of all three actors in the triadic dialogic relation described previously.
Indeed, such struggles for the public dimension involve a radical revision of the
concept of “normality”, an expanded discussion about the bonds of membership,
and of course a shift in perspective about the liberal ideal of neutrality. This
symbolic recognition requires an effort by all citizens belonging to the society, and
unlike the situation in the first two cases21, where such concerns were actually
irrelevant, it must be promoted and justified for the right reasons: by appealing to
the normative principle of equal respect.
4. The economic concept of public goods
In the second part of this paper, I analyse how the economic theory of public goods
casts some light on the discussion about equal distribution of public spaces. Starting
with Paul A. Samuelson’s classical definition of a public good: “which all enjoy in
common in the sense that each individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no
subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good”22, one observes,
ideally, how public space should constitute a public good. In fact, according to
classical liberal theory, the neutrality of the public sphere would allow anyone to
pursue her own conception of the good life without interference or suffering undue
disadvantages. Consequently, the public space is neutral in the sense that everyone
should enjoy it, barring that such use prevents the full use of the same public space
by someone else.
Within the economic theory of public goods, there are two main features that
distinguish such goods from others:
- non-rivalry: consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce
availability of the good for consumption by others;
- non-excludability: no one can be effectively excluded from using the good.
Moreover, public goods differ from private goods (excludable and rivalrous), club
goods (excludable but not rivalrous) and common goods (non-excludable, but
rivalrous).
One of the main issues concerning the theory of public goods is that they require
the social management provided by some public institution. In these instances, the
self-interest of individuals is deemed not able to provide a sufficiently strong
motivation to produce such goods. Consequently, in the event that there is a
condition of non-excludability for public goods, the economic theory of such goods
regards it as rational to be a free-rider. Indeed, by definition, a system that provides
public goods allows everyone to enjoy their benefits without fees, while
simultaneously do not establish the necessary constraints that oblige every citizen
to contribute to the production or maintenance (in case of natural resources) of
these same public goods23. Consequently, according to economists, in order for
society to avoid losing its incentive to provide public goods, it is critical that the
social benefits taken from those goods are greater than the cost of their production
(this cost is directly proportional to the number of free riders). Thus, an analysis of
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and promoting collective rights and justifying them by affirming the intrinsic value
of different cultures or different identities17.
A further point of tension is exemplified by the second case analysed: the idea
that the mere redistribution of goods is sometimes not sufficient. In fact, in order to
prevent the allocation of specific urban spaces to particular communities resulting in
the segregation and fragmentation of the city’s fabric, it is necessary that such
distributions be related to the appropriate recognition of identities. In fact, only
through this kind of correct recognition can distributions of urban areas be planned
in ways that promote a real integration of the minorities in question18.
Finally, the third case that I examined, the distribution of public space as a
symbolic place, showed that even when the distribution of material goods is not at
stake, the struggle could nonetheless be very contentious. Indeed, within the
contemporary context, many of the most contested cases (e.g. l’affaire du voil in
France, gay marriage, the crucifix in Italian courts, etc.) arise when the most salient
issue at stake is precisely the public recognition of identity differences by the
institutions of society. Assuming the traditional liberal interpretation of claims about
redistribution, these last kinds of clashes should not be so vexed, as there is no
distribution of “concrete” goods at stake. In fact, the traditional liberal paradigm
tends to treat identity differences as personal choices that do not pertain to the
sphere of justice19. In this regard, such a paradigm could not really achieve a fair
solution when faced with the on-going clashes between different identities for
control over the symbolic meaning of the polis. In fact, the struggle to widen the
cultural paradigm of “normal” citizen, apart from the symbolic meanings already
mentioned, has public and concrete outcomes as well. These outcomes involve a
revision of the bonds of membership and would force the majority to accept
normative constraints of equal respect towards all citizens, including members of
disadvantaged minorities. In dealing with negotiations around symbolic space, the
polis and its institutions must face issues that are intrinsically part of the definition
of liberalism itself: the possibility of improving the ideals of inclusiveness and the
legitimacy to be obtained through an ideal consensus given by all members of a
society. Indeed, such regulative ideals risk being jeopardized by the fact that liberal
institutions do not seem to be able to correctly answer these kinds of claims in
connection with how justice and equality should be implemented in the polis in the
face of minority identities and their hidden presence in the public space.
To conclude this first part of the paper, I compare the different ways in which
the three claims about public spaces deal with the agents involved in the
negotiation and the kind of reasons that support the distributions achieved. On the
one hand, the first two claims for public space involve limited issues such as the
distribution of goods locally determined and they imply a dialogue restricted to two
agents: citizens who belong to minority groups and the institutions involved in the
particular negotiation. Moreover (especially for the second case) there is the
possibility for a distribution of public spaces that promotes segregation, rather than
inclusion20. On the other hand, in the third case, the “symbolic” enlargement of the
public space to identities that had at one time been excluded implies the
12 Diverse Distributions of Public Space – A Public Good for Whom?
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instead, it is derived from a notion that what should be made “public” is the reason
for justifying the allocation of some specific opportunities in order to offset
previous disadvantages. Finally, regarding claims to conceptions of symbolic space,
public space should, at least at the level of ideal theory, correspond to the concept
of a pure public good: a good that can never be either excludable or rivalrous. Of
course, the existence in theory of such a regulative ideal does not imply the real
existence of this pure kind of public good in contemporary societies. On the
contrary, as I suggested earlier, contemporary rivalries for public space as symbolic
good are a source for many of the most disagreeable conflicts in multicultural
democracies.
This comparison among different claims for public spaces coupled with the
economic concept of a public good has allowed me to point out that public space (at
least as analysed in these three cases) may always turn out to be associated with a
public good:
Case 1: the allocation of public space reserved for use by specific communities
tends to coincide with an impure public good. There is, in fact, the possibility that
majority members could exercise their power of excluding minorities from obtaining
some public space as a means towards a particular group’s end (e.g. confessional
schools). However, such claims do not imply matters of rivalry, as the group’s use of
the good in question does not reduce the possibility of its consumption by others.
Case 2: the possibility of allocating private spaces via public justification
legitimated by a fairness argument seems to coincide with a mixed merit good. Here
we are dealing with a distribution of private spaces that are both excludable and
rivalrous; however, they assume a significant public value in light of their
involvement with positive externalities. In particular, merit goods are defined as
those goods or services to which the community ascribes social value because they
are considered useful to the moral and social development of society itself
(education, health care, housing, etc.)25.
Case 3: the distribution of symbolic recognition could be defined in terms of a
pure public good, because, as noted above, the liberal ideal of inclusiveness,
including the normative principles of tolerance and equal respect, require liberal
society to make public space over into something that is both non-rivalrous and non-
excludable.
To sum up, the comparison with the economic point of view has permitted me to
emphasize that one of the most significant aspects of the production of public goods
is an inherently motivational issue. In fact, besides the problem of the rationality of
free-riding for individuals mentioned above, the theory of public goods must also
face one of the perennial issues of collective choice: the possibility that achieving an
efficient allocation of goods is not sufficient to motivate individuals towards
agreement. Concerning public goods, the possibility of a Pareto-efficient outcome is
outweighed by the difficulties of collective reasoning26. Consequently, the last
paragraph of this paper analyses the ways in which liberal theory could support the
polis, showing how it could be used to improve the collaborations and negotiations
among citizens and institutions.
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the concept of public goods evinces the classic description of a “free-rider”
problem. It is emblematic of the lack of personal motivation that often occurs when
public, rather than purely personal interests, are at stake. This insight could be
useful for discussions about the public space, as the main tensions created by public
space claims may relate to the lack of motivation in citizens for understanding the
justice framed reasons that underpin these claims. In fact, the motivational issue
recalls our earlier discussion of membership as a pre-requisite to obtaining the
benefits associated with full citizenship in a liberal polis. Hence, we observe that in
contemporary multicultural democracies, what is at stake is precisely the
emergence of internal rivalries caused by the overcrowding of different identities
within the same public space. Members of the majority feel that they have a
“natural” right to share public goods, while other citizens have to struggle to obtain
the same amount of public goods. In this regard, these rivalries for the distribution
of public goods demonstrate that the access to citizenship should involve not only
rights, but also duties. In fact, belonging to a liberal polis (a liberal society) on one
hand, involves benefits derived from collective actions, but on the other, it requires
everybody’s good will in maintaining a stable and just society (at least in some
aspects). Hence, returning to the issue of public recognition, it is worth noting that
a serious problem exists for claims by minority identities, as members of the
majority often fail to see the justice-driven reasons that support them, much less the
personal or motivational reasons for accepting them. Indeed, majority members
tend to regard such demands as an unjustified aggression against the public space
itself, without ever noticing (or perhaps refusing to note) that the status quo is
already culturally mediated by stereotypes regarding who belongs to the polis by
full right and who, instead, is not directly entitled to it. Thus, citizens belonging in
the majority fail to acknowledge that the public space is always managed by some
parties more than others. That said, some minority groups (especially immigrant or
religious minorities) risk incurring the free-riding phenomenon, in the event that
they demand certain recognitions without also accepting the structural rules that
govern liberal democratic institutions24.
Now, in order to better reconnect the arguments I have been describing in this
paper, I would like to compare the different claims for public space using the
economic concept of public goods. First, I will interpret the three case studies based
on the two necessary features of public goods (non-rivalrous and non-
excludability). In our first case (i.e., the claim to public space for use by specific
communities) at issue is not a rivalry about the same space but rather the
exclusionary power that could be exercised by a privileged majority. Conversely, in
the second case (i.e., where public space is distributed to individuals by virtue of
their belonging to certain disadvantaged groups), there is a significant problem on
one hand, in terms of a rivalry for the distribution of a scarce good, and on the
other, over the possibility of excluding certain groups from the distribution. Among
the three cases, this account is the most consistent with the allocation paradigm for
the distribution of social goods. Moreover, the public dimension assumed by such
claims does not derive from a notion that the space distributed is strictly “public”;
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vice versa). Again, the theory of public goods is useful, since it has already shown
that in order to achieve collective actions, it is more important to evaluate individual
dispositions and the manner in which certain common decisions are made, than it is
simply to analyse questions of efficiency or rationality. In this regard, it is important
to distinguish between the potential outcomes of a negotiation and the reasons that
underlie it. Indeed, what should be most relevant is precisely the ground of justice
that drives institutions and citizens alike to consider possible modifications of the
status quo. Such a ground, because it is acceptable and thus legitimate for
everybody, necessarily invokes a normative principle of equal respect. Indeed, by
referring to this principle, it is possible to demonstrate that claims for the equal
distribution of public space (Case 1 and 3) or for the reparative redistribution that
favours the most disadvantaged (Case 2) similarly involve the same principle of
liberal coexistence. Ultimately, these requests all arrive at the issue of equal
membership rights and visibility in the polis. The principle of equal respect, along
with an individualizing act of recognition, allows institutions to reach specific
solutions for each particular case that must be negotiated. In fact, such
individualizing acts facilitate the realization of the contextual disadvantaged
condition of those making claims for redistribution. However, this procedure of
finding ad hoc solutions through individualizing acts is not incompatible with the
liberal ideals of universality and neutrality, as every recognition via equal respect
requires a second background argument for resulting justifiable. This second
argumentative step is a generalizing act that argues for the common humanity behind
individual differences and, therefore, legitimizes the practice of giving equal respect
to everybody as a universal moral constraints28. Thus, every individualizing act is
always subsumed under an umbrella of universal civil and political rights that
constitute the social status of equal citizenship. Consequently, the underlying reason
of justice for promoting different and contextual solutions is the universal principle
that every individual is entitled to equal respect.
This last discussion about equal respect highlights how the proper management
of the distribution of public spaces must be promoted for both normative and
pragmatic reasons. On the one hand, if such public spaces are only entitled to a
privileged majority, than the polis will lose part of its normative legitimacy, as
institutions would not be treating all citizens with equal respect. On the other hand,
promoting negotiations supported by good reasons and by a fair dialogical
dimension not only allows justice to develop, but fosters the stability of the polis.
Starting from a membership perspective, it is important to stress that liberal society,
besides the necessity for it to be just, should also obtain its stability for the right
reasons29. Thus, fostering equal respect among citizens, and between citizens and
institutions, is not only necessary from a normative point of view, but it is also
relevant to maintaining a stable society. Indeed, from a pragmatic perspective, it is
worth noting that democratic institutions, through adequate interpretations and
theoretical revisions, could show its citizens that requests for sharing a public
conception of justice are not too demanding. In fact, returning to the idea of the
polis as the public space where citizens share rights and duties, I would stipulate
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5. Liberal Negotiations
The analysis of the economic concept of public goods allowed me to show that the
various claims for distributing public spaces imply tensions and difficulties, yet for
reasons that are different each time. Sometimes problems are created by the power
of excludability possessed by the majority of the polis. At other times, what is at
stake rather is the perception of a rivalry for a scarce resource and the concomitant
fight to obtain such a good. 
However, in all of the cases analysed, a problem seems to return from time to
time: the difficulty of motivating people who feel they are “de jure” members of the
polis to accept distributions of public space so as to offset disadvantages that have
their origins in history. Members of the majority do not easily recognize that they are
thinking according to double standards that discriminate between what is “normal”
and what is defined according to a standard paradigm for membership. From the
majority perspective, the public space has always existed; moreover, these “first
class” citizens cannot effortlessly understand why the community should attempt to
broaden its inclusiveness or accept new symbols and new identities into the public
sphere. In this way, the hostile attitude of citizens who belong to the majority is
explained using the theory of public goods. However, according to the theory of
collective action, public goods are still produced by overcoming motivational
deficits, when one individual benefits more from the public good than it costs him to
produce it. Of course, majorities in our democracies belong to privileged groups
whose membership in the polis is immediate and “inexpensive”, such that the
benefits they obtain from collaboration are extremely high. Hence, the claims raised
by minority identities for revisions of such membership standards or for the
redistribution of public space are the means by which majority members suspect
they will lose some of their privileges27. Therefore, such requests create extreme
tension, as the majority (idealized here as a homogeneous self-interested agent) has
rational reasons for opposing certain claims laid by disadvantaged identities, who
also have good reasons for contrasting a status quo that favours the majority groups.
Thus, it can be said that the rational actions of different collective agents do not
engender a fair and stable public agreement. In order to properly manage these
tensions, it is necessary that democratic institutions engage in the development of a
triadic dialogue, among majority, minority and themselves. Moreover, a fair solution
requires that claims be assessed according to two different, though compatible,
perspectives:
- a normative perspective that interprets claims in terms of justice and the equal
respect that liberal institutions owe all individuals in the polis and;
- a dialogical and contextual perspective of negotiation for framing actual
decisions about the distribution of space.
Whether public actions proceed top-down (decisions by institutions) or bottom
up (via citizens’ requests), it is important to draw a line between these two
perspectives. As a matter of fact, even when negotiations occur correctly, according
to justice-oriented reasons, the outcomes are not always entirely satisfactory (and
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a fair dialogic relationship among citizens who are members of different groups
(horizontal relation) and among all citizens and institutions (vertical relation)31. In
this regard, I believe that assuming such a negotiating perspective could be the
proper liberal way for achieving stability (i.e., by loyalty) and thus also for
strengthening the bonds of membership. 
Conclusions
The main objective of this paper was to show that the distribution of public space to
minorities is one way in which liberal institutions can properly justify the ideal of
inclusiveness and increase the stability of the polis and mutual respect between
citizens32. Ensuring the fair distribution of the public space is an essential task for
liberal institutions; moreover, by achieving this outcome, the same institutions also
help to improve the liberal theoretical paradigm. The extension and development of
this theory emerges from the fact that such claims involve eminently “public”
negotiations and thus it is necessary that all members of the polis, as well as the
institutions themselves, take part in a discussion that ultimately becomes a
multilogic dialogue. Assuming a negotiating and work in progress perspective could
be of a decided advantage to liberal institutions, as not all solutions are provided in
advance by theory. This “incompleteness” of liberal theory permits institutions to be
flexible while nonetheless maintaining the necessary argumentative rigour.
The three different cases of distribution of public spaces discussed in this paper
have enabled me to interpret public space in terms of a public good, whose
distribution involves all members of the polis even if from each own perspective of
agent with personal interests and motivations. Moreover, this parallel has led me to
stress that allocative issues are always related to a struggle for the redefinition of
membership and that the rigid dichotomy between distribution and recognition does
not allow us to distinguish some of the relevant points for managing the distribution
of public space.
Finally, I have showed that these distributions, obtained by means of bitter and
complex public negotiations, could be understood according two different
perspectives: by a normative analysis that offers the reasons of justice, grounded on
the equal respect due to everyone; and by a contextual analysis of the way in which
principles of equal respect and liberal inclusiveness can lead to fair negotiations
through a triadically structured public dialogue. Substantially, it is important to
distinguish between the normative reasons for justice that can never be set aside, and
the actual outcomes of a process that are always revisable. If liberal institutions
accept and engage themselves in negotiations (viewed largely as work in progress)
with citizens then the polis will be not just be the place where associative bonds are
established and stabilized, but also the place where the associative paradigm could
be questioned if it produces injustice and discrimination. In this regard, the polis
would become exactly that “public space” in which all individuals are equally
entitled to be first-class citizens.
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that the outcomes of fair negotiations could, at least from a contextual perspective,
allow for overcoming the motivational deficits intrinsic to the collective production
of public goods.
In this final part of the paper, I would like to address the possibility that the same
dialogic practice between institutions and citizens could bind these same citizens to
certain liberal background principles. That is, the analysis of particular claims to the
public space shows that the same minority groups might already be carriers of
certain ideals about political society itself. If one believes in being entitled (by right)
to fight for the recognition of their identity, not only in terms of a public
acquiescence for private individualistic differences (classical model of neutrality),
but via a public recognition of these differences, then it means that individuals who
raise such claims believe that liberal society has particular obligations towards its
citizens. In this regard, if a claimant struggles for the public recognition of her
identity (or for a specific need) and it is acknowledged that such recognition is “due”
and publicly justifiable, then the same claimant (at least implicitly) has demonstrated
her acceptance of a background of liberal principles. In fact, is the same dynamic of
public negotiation that shows it: when citizens direct claims towards institutions and
the public acts of doing so reflect the confidence of getting a positive answer;
essentially they are declaring that they believe that these institutions can indeed
respond properly to their requests. Consequently, the normative principles
underlying liberal institutions are recognized, at least implicitly, by those advancing
claims for an equal distribution and for a fair public recognition.
On the basis of this last part of the analysis, it can be argued that the dialectical
relationship between those who claim recognition and the institutions that address
such requests is the place where the polis realizes both the full inclusion of all its
citizens and stability. Indeed, the right way for achieving stability is through the
citizens’ loyalty. In fact, those citizens who claim recognition, not through force but
by establishing a dialogue with civil society, show that they consider the public
invisibility of certain identities as illegitimate and unjust within a purportedly liberal
society. Consequently, they are starting to converge, at least in a minimal way, on the
liberal paradigm of inclusiveness and equal respect towards all persons. Thus, liberal
societies that show a flexibility and willingness to revise theoretical paradigms can
promote stability via loyalty towards its institutions. Indeed, this iIs precisely the
experience of public recognition grounded in the principle of equal respect. It
improves citizen loyalty as the institutions of the polis prove their ability to respond
properly to these requests. Thus, the same normative principles that have enabled the
current arrangement are likely to be recognized and appreciated by those who have
obtained a fair outcome on account of the liberal management of public conflict.
To conclude, I suggest that public negotiations achieved for correct reasons (i.e.,
justice, or the liberal ideals of equal respect and inclusiveness) and that produce a
real increase in the equality of the distribution of public spaces can be normatively
reconnected to the “social capital” of a liberal society30. In fact, the liberal
background culture, besides providing a connection to a normative core that
legitimates redistributions and public recognitions, is also the means for developing
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21 It is worth noting, in fact, that where a real distribution of material goods is involved, like in the
two first cases analysed, it is possible that such distribution are granted for the wrong reasons. Of
course, such results are not desirable; however, in these cases, the relevant aspect is the effectiveness of
distribution. On the contrary, in the case of symbolic distribution what is distributed, equal respect,
must necessarily be combined with a justification for the right reason, otherwise the distribution itself
would be useless. For an analysis of wrong reasons in favour of the right to wear the Islamic veil in
public schools, see Galeotti, 1993.
22 Samuelson, 1954, p. 387.
23 Hence, it could be affirmed that free-riding is an optimum choice from an individualistic point of
view, but that such choice is not Pareto-efficient from the social point of view. See Varian, 1997.
24 “They are fellow participants, like the members of the opposing team in a basketball game,
without whom there could not be a game, and who therefore have a right to score baskets and win, if
they can. Problems arise only in the case of people who want to disrupt the game, while still
claiming the rights of players and the protection of the rules”, Walzer, 1997, p. 166. Moreover, for a
deep analysis of collective choice reconnected with this idea of fair play, see Miller and Sartorius,
1979.
25 Is important to specify that these goods are called “merit goods,” but not because their
distribution depends on the merit of single individuals. Rather, they are the same goods that have the
merit of guaranteeing positive externalities if they are produced and distributed among citizens. See
Fiorito and Kollintzas, 2004.
26 Unlike private goods that are managed by the market, economic theory does not posses an
instrument for evaluating the ratio between individuals’ self-interest and the price that everybody
would be ready to pay for obtaining a portion of determined public goods. Hence, one of the main
issues about public goods is the determination of the “demand function”. About this issue and for an
interesting analysis of collective choice achieved via referenda, see Noam, 1982.
27 Galeotti (1999, p. 42) speaks about the positional good of monopoly for the exercise of control
about social standards.
28 See Galeotti, 2010.
29 See Rawls, 1993.
30 See Rawls, 1993 and Soysal, 1997, p. 510.
31 Kymlicka (2007, p. 96), in this regard, speaks about a process of citisenisation: “The task for all
liberal democracies has been to turn this catalogue of uncivil relations into relationships of liberal-
democratic citizenship, in terms of both the vertical relationship between the members of minorities
and the state, and the horizontal relationships amongst the members of different groups”.
32 Tully, 2000, p. 475.
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Toleration has been invoked as a philosophical and political ideal aiming at bringing
social stability and pacific coexistence to modern societies. Nowadays, appeals to
toleration animate the political debate about policies addressed to meet minorities
requests and claims, among which the allocation of public spaces is more and more
relevant. Although the theory and practice of toleration have been focused on from
several points of view and largely discussed, those requests and claims give rise to
reformulation and further articulation. In this paper I will analyze the meanings of
toleration as a preliminary step to cope with the core question of the present research:
the redistribution of public spaces conceived as urban, public, private and symbolic
spaces, aimed at different groups within the multicultural societies. Specifically, this
research aims at identifying the right model of redistribution corresponding to a
revised idea of toleration grounded in the principle of respect. The hypothesis is that
grounding toleration on equal respect for persons may contribute to developing
redistribution policies combining the basic commitment to equality with the need to
accommodate cultural diversity without undermining social cohesion. 
My contribution to this research aims at showing how toleration has been
conceived as the liberal strategy to respond to deep disagreement which makes a
political agreement on liberal institutions difficult if not prima facie impossible. To
do that, I will deal first with the notion of toleration, starting by emphasising the
negative feelings connected to it. Then, as a second step, I will move on to consider
toleration from a political point of view, hence it can be qualified as negative and
positive toleration. Positive meanings of toleration as both moral and social virtue
will be drawn by showing how it works in favour of a peaceful cohabitation among
diversities with special regard to minority groups. The justification for toleration
comes to be based on fairness as a principle of political justice. As the traditional
articulation of the ideal of toleration as fairness corresponds to the liberal principle
of neutrality - only constitutional settings which are neutral between different
conceptions of the good may be reasonably accepted by everyone - in the third step,
I will concentrate on cultural differences, those that seem to be resistant to the
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